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Abstract
Wealth inequality is one of the most pressing issues facing 
America today. Currently, the top ten percent of American 
households control over 84 percent of all American wealth, a 
proportion that has increased over 300 percent since 1986. While this 
issue continues to generate intense scrutiny from both sides of the 
political aisle, the role the federal securities laws play in facilitating 
wealth inequality goes largely unnoticed. In their present form, the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 
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contain exemptions to their registration and disclosure requirements 
that apply only to private placements—securities offerings and 
investment funds not offered for sale on a public securities 
marketplace. In the interest of investor protection, the Securities Act 
and the Investment Company Act prevent all but the extremely 
wealthy from investing in these private placements. Over the past 
two decades, wealthy investors comprising no more than the top ten 
percent of all Americans have been able to use the advantages of 
private placements to accumulate investment returns denied to the 
average middle class investor. This Note will outline how the 
exclusive private placement kingdom has contributed to wealth 
inequality in America and why the time has come to give the average 
investor the keys to this kingdom. 
I. INTRODUCTION
In his 2015 State of the Union address, President Barak 
Obama declared that wealth inequality is one of the greatest 
challenges facing the United States today.1 The President challenged 
Americans to confront the issue, declaring, “Will we accept an 
economy where only a few of us do spectacularly well?”2
Republican presidential contenders such as Jeb Bush have also 
joined the chorus of commentators concerned about income 
inequality.3 While discussions of wealth inequality frequently deal 
explicitly with the ability of the very rich to easily accumulate 
greater wealth through capital appreciation—particularly returns on 
investment securities—the role that federal securities regulation 
plays in facilitating this outcome receives relatively little attention.4
Preventing excessive wealth disparity is not a stated 
objective of the U.S. securities laws.5 The U.S. Securities and 
                                                          
1 Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union (Jan. 20, 2015) 
(transcript available at http://perma.cc/9BVX-E22Q).
2 Id. 
3 Brendan Nyhan, Why Republicans Are Suddenly Talking About Economic 
Inequality, New York Times (Feb. 13, 2015), http://perma.cc/4DKZ-NK8Q.
4 See generally, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(Harvard University Press 2013); CHARLES E. HURST, SOCIAL INEQUALITY: FORMS,
CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES (Pearson Education 2007). 
5 See Jasmin Sethi, Another Role for Securities Regulation: Expanding Investor 
Opportunity, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 783, 796 (2011) (“[S]ecurities 
regulation can . . . be justified on a number of grounds, but historically, expanding 
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the federal agency tasked with 
implementing the federal securities laws, states that its mission is “to 
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets, and 
facilitate capital formation.”6 Although wealth disparity appears 
nowhere in the identified intentions of the securities laws, the current 
structure of the laws nevertheless facilitates the concentration of 
wealth in the hands of the wealthiest ten percent of Americans. 
This Note will argue that the federal securities laws facilitate 
wealth inequality by denying average middle class investors the 
ability to participate in the private placement (or “alternative 
investment”7) securities market.8 The private placement market 
comprises all securities offerings exempt from the registration and 
disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities 
Act”) and the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment 
Company Act”).9 These offerings of securities are usually referred to 
as private placements because they are not available for purchase on 
a public securities market, such as a public stock exchange.
Working from the assumption that private placements are 
inherently riskier than public securities such as stocks, bonds, and 
                                                                                                                           
opportunities for wealth accumulation across sectors of the population has not been 
a justification that has been given credence.”). 
6 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://perma.cc/45AG-K6H3 (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
7 “Alternative Investment” is a largely undefined term often used to refer to any 
investment other than stocks, bonds, mutual funds, or cash, but it typically refers to 
investments in private investment funds. While the SEC does refer to direct stock 
purchases in private companies as “alternative investments,” see, e.g., Investor 
Alert: Self-Directed IRAs and the Risk of Fraud, INVESTOR.GOV,
http://perma.cc/LN72-C493 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015), the more common label for 
any non-public securities offering is a “private placement,” see, e.g., Private 
Placements Under Regulation D, INVESTOR.GOV, http://perma.cc/Z2WN-MSFQ (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2015). To avoid confusion, this Note will refer to both private 
investment funds and direct stock purchases in private companies collectively as 
“private placements.”
8 While this Note addresses wealth inequality, the argument deals primarily with 
how the already wealthy accumulate even greater wealth relative to the middle class. 
The reasons for wealth inequality at the other end of the spectrum—why the already 
poor continue to fall further behind the middle class—are outside the scope of this 
Note.
9 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77a- to -aa (2012)) [hereinafter Securities Act]; Investment Company Act 
of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1
to -64 (2012)) [hereinafter Investment Company Act].
3
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mutual funds,10 the federal securities laws permit only certain high 
net worth and high-income individuals to invest in private 
placements.11 The common justification for this restriction is that 
wealth—as measured by net worth and net income—serves as the 
most practicable proxy for the ability to “fend for oneself in a 
transaction”12 without the investor protections afforded by the 
Securities Act and the Investment Company Act. 13 Scholars have 
frequently noted, however, that this objective standard, intended for 
administrative ease, may be both under protective of wealthy 
investors and over protective of non-wealthy investors.14 The current 
federal securities laws presume, somewhat paternalistically, that 
while the average middle class investor can “risk his shirt”15 on the 
public stock markets, only the wealthy investor can risk his shirt in a 
private placement. Nevertheless, “U.S. securities regulations award 
special investment privileges to the already affluent, resulting in a 
legal system that makes it even easier for them to amass wealth.”16 
The overriding approach to mitigating this outcome has been 
to suggest alternatives to net worth and net income that more closely 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; 
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, SEC Release No. 8766 
at 8 (Dec. 27, 2006), [hereinafter SEC Release 8766].
11 See infra Part II.
12 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
13 See SEC Release 8766, supra note 10, at 7 (“We adopted the $1,000,000 net 
worth and $200,000 income standards in 1982 based on our view that these tests 
would provide appropriate and objective standards to meet our goal of ensuring that 
such persons who are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of an investment in 
private offerings may invest in one.”).
14 See, e.g., Greg Oguss, Note, Should Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in 
Federal Securities Laws? 107 NW. U. L. REV. 285, 291 (2012). Some articles have 
drawn attention to the fact that Paris Hilton is an accredited investor who may 
participate in private placements while an investment banker who recently graduated 
with an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School may not have the requisite net worth 
or income to make those same investments. Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated 
Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 
Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733 (2009). But see Oguss, supra at 294, noting that 
wealthy investors can “purchase sophistication” by hiring financial advisers to make 
investment decisions on their behalf. This, however, does not obviate the basic truth 
that even the most sophisticated investor is not immune against losses resulting from 
fraud and deception, regardless whether their investments are private or public. See 
Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated 
Investor,” 40. U. BALT. L. REV. 215 (2010).
15 Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 
3428-29 (2013).
16 So-Yeon Lee, Why the ‘Accredited Investor’ Standard Fails the Average Investor,
31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 987, 987 (2012).
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approximate the sophistication needed to fend for oneself.17 Most of 
these approaches concentrate exclusively on the over or under 
inclusive nature of the current securities laws, not the implicit 
inequity they create vis-à-vis middle class Americans. Little serious 
discussion exists about whether we ought to have an independent 
realm of private placements accessible only to wealthy investors. 
SEC attorney Jasmin Sethi, an advocate for expanding investor 
opportunity, sums-up this moral dilemma best:
Access to financial markets, like access to education, 
employment, public accommodations, and a host of 
other areas, is significant in promoting opportunity. 
In the case of financial markets, the opportunity at 
stake is the opportunity to create and accumulate 
wealth. The adage, “it takes money to make money,” 
or, in other words, the assumption that wealth is 
required to create more wealth, embodies the idea 
that wealth results from the taking of large risks and 
that the wealthy are more likely and better able to 
bear such risks. While these assumptions do have 
some truth to them, a societal problem arises when 
government action perpetuates the superior 
opportunities of the wealthy to become wealthier. 
Inequity in the opportunity to grow wealth should 
not be facilitated by the government any more than 
inequities in opportunities for education, 
employment, accommodations, and the like.18
That is not to say that the private placement market ought 
not to exist. On the contrary, the financial industry needs a certain 
amount of flexibility in order to develop novel investment products 
able to increase aggregate wealth (or in economic terms, total 
surplus).19 At the same time, the inequity of excluding the private 
market to average investors is inexcusable. In the aftermath of the 
“Great Recession,” increasing the investment opportunities available 
to the average American may prove critical. Savings rates among the 
middle class have declined, the 2008 financial crisis caused up to a 
75 percent drop in some retirement savings accounts, and the value 
                                                          
17 See infra sources cited and text accompanying notes 258-262.
18 Sethi, supra note 5, at 797-98. 
19 See, e.g., Investment Company Act Amendments of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1495 
Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th 
Cong. 4 (1995).
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of primary residences—a traditional source of investment wealth for 
middle class Americans—has declined precipitously.20
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) requires that the SEC 
revisit one of the most ubiquitous features of the private offerings 
regime, the Accredited Investor definition with respect to natural 
persons,21 ostensibly with the objective of further limiting who is 
eligible to invest in private placements.22 This mandated review 
marks a turning point. Will Congress and the SEC embrace an open, 
egalitarian investment marketplace or one that benefits primarily the 
already wealthy? Although preventing runaway wealth disparity is 
not a stated objective of the U.S. securities laws,23 the time has come 
for Congress and the SEC to adopt a more egalitarian approach to 
private placements. The time has come to give the average investor 
the keys to the kingdom.  
Through both a notional discussion of the advantages to 
private placements and an empirical study of investment returns, this 
Note will argue that the current legal structure of the private 
placement exemptions has contributed to the growth in wealth 
inequality in America. Part II will outline the current legal 
framework of private placements. Part III will then discuss the 
advantages private placements sometimes possess over public 
markets. Using two case studies in particular—the technology bubble 
of the 1990’s and the financial crisis of 2008—Part IV will 
empirically demonstrate that the advantages of private placements 
allow their wealthy investors to preserve capital and generate higher 
long-term returns. Finally, Part V will discuss many of the proposals 
for expanding investor access to the private placement market. 
II. PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND WHO CAN INVEST
The two principal components of the private placement 
market are direct investments in privately owned companies and 
investments in private investment funds. There are three major kinds 
of private investment funds: hedge funds, private equity funds, and 
                                                          
20 Lee, supra note 16, at 1008-11. 
21 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 413 (2010).  
22 Lee, supra note 16, at 990-91 (“the dominant narrative offered as an explanation 
for the Great Recession of 2008 [is] that investors took risks that they did not 
understand”).
23 Sethi, supra note 5, at 796.
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venture capital funds. The term “hedge fund” has no official 
definition.24 The defining characteristic of hedge funds is their 
exemption from the Investment Company Act,25 a statute that limits 
the positional strategies of registered investment funds (such as 
mutual funds) and their ability to use leverage.26 Exemption from the 
Investment Company Act allows hedge funds to use unique trading 
strategies in the expectation of generating returns in both bull and 
bear markets.27 Unlike hedge funds, which focus primarily (although 
not exclusively) on short-term gains, private equity funds seek long-
term gains by acquiring portfolio company securities and liquidating 
their positions at the end of a specified term, usually five to ten 
years.28 Venture capital funds are a subset of private equity funds 
that specialize in early-stage companies.29 Unlike a traditional 
private equity fund, a venture capital fund typically seeks to exit its 
portfolio company investments once they reach a target price and not 
at the end of a specified term.30 A venture fund usually achieves exit 
of its investments either through an initial public offering (“IPO”) or 
by selling the portfolio company to a strategic buyer.31  
Sales and purchases of securities in private companies 
comprise the other major component of the private placement 
market. Most of this investment occurs when an issuer, a business 
entity seeking to raise capital by selling its own securities, elects to 
conduct a private placement in lieu of an IPO. Many issuers, 
particularly emerging companies, prefer to raise capital through 
private placements because of the significant cost savings.32 This has 
                                                          
24 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, 3 (2003) 
(available at http://perma.cc/SAG2-2RG5); see also Matthew Goldstein, A Secret 
Society: Hedge Funds and Their Mysterious Success, 6 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 111, 114 
(2007).
25 SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 3.
26 Id. at 6.
27 Goldstein, supra note 24, at 114. A “long” position refers to the traditional 
strategy of expecting the value of an investment to increase over time. On the 
contrary, a “short” position assumes that an investment will lose value. The ability 
of hedge funds to take both positions concurrently is how they derive their name; 
they are able to “hedge” the risk of long positions by taking short positions. Id
28 SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 7-8.
29 Id. at 8.
30 Id. 
31 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3406-07.
32 By avoiding an IPO for as long as possible, an issuer can escape the costs of 
preparing a prospectus and a registration statement, avoid the delay costs associated 
with the SEC comment process, preserve the confidentiality of company 
information, evade compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and avoid obtaining a 
7
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resulted in the growth of the private placement market at the expense 
of IPOs, particularly for smaller companies.33 This trend may mean 
fewer and fewer options for average investors relative to the size of 
the entire securities market.34 
The unifying characteristic of all private placements is that 
they are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities 
Act.35 In addition, all private investment funds are also exempt from 
the provisions of the Investment Company Act.36 In order to achieve 
exemption from the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act, 
a securities offering or investment fund must meet an enumerated 
registration exemption.37 The most common exemptions are the 
private offering exemptions,38 encompassing offerings of securities 
not considered part of a “public offering.”39 These exemptions 
include Securities Act section 4(a)(2), Securities Act section 4(a)(5), 
Regulation D, Investment Company Act section 3(a)(1), and 
Investment Company Act section 3(a)(7). All the private offering 
exemptions share one significant requirement: they restrict 
investment participation to specific high income and high net-worth 
individuals through, in the case of the Securities Act, the accredited 
investor standard, or, in the case of the Investment Company Act, the 
even more restrictive qualified purchaser standard.
A. Securities Act Section 4(a)(2), Regulation D, and the 
Accredited Investor 
In order to provide investors with adequate information with 
which to make an informed investment decision,40 the Securities Act 
requires any issuer seeking to sell securities to either register the 
                                                                                                                           
credit rating on public debt. See Lee, supra note 16, at 1005-06 (citing MELANIE L.
FEIN, SECURITIES OF ACTIVITIES BANKS § 10.01 (4th ed. 2011)).
33 See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3407 (citing Douglas J. Leary, M&A 
Landscape in 2013: Whither the Bottom?, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS LAW 
2013: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 55 
(2013), available at 2013 WL 574804, at *4).
34 See Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings, 
78 Fed. Reg. 44730, 44755 [hereinafter “Disqualification of Bad Actors”]; Lee, 
supra note 16, at 1006-06.
35 SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 5-8.
36 Id.
37 See infra Part II.A. and Part II.B.
38 See Disqualification of Bad Actors, supra note 34, at 44753-54.
39 Securities Act § 4(a)(2), (5), 15 U.S.C. § 77a- to -aa (2012); Investment Company 
Act § 3(c)(1), (7), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -64 (2012).
40 77 CONG. REC. 2913 (May 5, 1933).
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securities offering with the SEC or qualify for an exemption from 
registration.41 The current private offering exemption originated in 
what was originally section 4(1) of the Securities Act, which 
exempted any “transactions by an not involving any public 
offering.”42 It is unclear precisely what transactions the drafters of 
the Securities Act intended to exempt through Section 4(1).43 In the 
seminal case Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina 
Company, the Supreme Court promulgated what remain the twin 
aims of the private offering exemption—access to the information 
normally provided in a registration statement and the ability to fend 
for oneself in a transaction.44 The SEC has always understood the 
Ralston Purina decision to mean that investors in offerings exempt 
under section 4(1)—presently section 4(a)(2)— had to have 
“sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business 
matters to . . . evaluate the merits of the prospective investment or . . 
. [be] able to bear the economic risk of the investment.”45
Originally, the SEC determined whether a securities 
purchaser met this standard using a subjective analysis.46 This 
procedure changed when Congress enacted the Small Business 
Investment Incentive Act of 1980, which added section 4(6)—now 
section 4(a)(5)—to the Securities Act.47 Section 4(a)(5) created a 
new private offering exemption available exclusively to “accredited 
investors,”48 but left it to the SEC to define who qualified as an 
accredited investor.49 Congress directed the SEC to take into account 
factors including “financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge and 
experience in financial matters, or amount of assets under 
management.”50 To implement section 4(a)(5) and define who 
qualified as an accredited investor, the SEC in 1981 adopted a 
                                                          
41 Securities Act §§ 5-7. 
42 Id. § 4(a)(2).  
43 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 122 (1953) 
(“The Securities Act nowhere defines the scope of § 4(1)’s private offering 
exemption. Nor is the legislative history of much help in staking out its 
boundaries.”).
44 Id. at 124-26.
45 SEC Release 8766, supra note 10, at 7.
46 Id.
47 Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-447, 94 Stat. 
2294 (1980).
48 Id. § 602 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(5)).
49 Id. § 603 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15)(ii)).
50 Id.
9
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comprehensive private offering exemption called Regulation D, 
presently comprising Securities Act Rules 500 to 506.51
The foundation of Regulation D is the accredited investor 
standard, defined in SEC Rule 501.52 Along with certain institutional 
investors, Rule 501 defines as an accredited investor “any natural 
person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that 
person’s spouse, exceeds $1,000,000” excluding the value of the 
person’s primary residence, 53 or “any natural person who had an
individual income in excess of $200,000 . . . or joint income with 
that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000.”54 The SEC estimates 
that, as of 2010, approximately 8.7 million U.S. households qualify 
as accredited investors based on the $1 million net worth standard, or 
approximately 7.4 percent of U.S. investors.55 Based on 2010 income 
tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service, only about one 
percent of single taxpayers have an annual income of over $200,000, 
and only about five percent of married taxpayers have a joint income 
in excess of $300,000.56
Rules 504, 505, and 506 outline the requirements for the 
Regulation D registration exemptions.57 Under Rules 504 and 505, 
issuers must ensure their securities offerings are exempt under both 
federal securities law and state securities law.58 Securities Act 
section 18, however, grants “covered securities” status and preempts 
state law for all securities sold under Rule 506.59 Consequently, Rule 
                                                          
51 See Proposed Revision of Regulation C, Registration and Regulation 12B, 
Registration and Reporting, 46 Fed. Reg. 41971 (proposed Aug. 18, 1981) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 201, 230 & 240).
52 17 C.F.R. § 230.501.
53 Id. § 230.501(a)(5).
54 Id. § 230.501(a)(6).
55 Disqualification of Bad Actors, supra note 34, at 44756.
56 SOI TAX SATS – INDIVIDUAL STATISTICAL TABLES BY FILING STATUS,
www.irs.gov/uac/SOI_Tax-Stats---Individual-Statistical-Tables-by-Filing-
Status$_grp1 (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
57 Rules 504 and 505 are exemptions under Securities Act section 4(a)(5) as opposed 
to 4(a)(2). Presently, Rule 504 exempts from registration sales of up to $1 million of 
securities sold in a twelve-month period only to accredited investors or securities 
sold to accredited investors in reliance on state registration exemptions. Rule 505 
exempts up to $5 million of securities sold in a twelve-month period only to 
accredited investors and up to 35 non-accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504-06.
58 See infra sources cited note 62.
59 Securities Act § 18(b)(4)(E). Technically, the provision exempts sales of 
securities relying on “Commission rules or regulations issued under section 4[a](2).” 
As the general 4(a)(2) exemption is not a Commission rule or regulation, and Rules 
504 and 505 are issued under Securities Act section 4(a)(6), Securities Act section 
18(b)(4)(E) only covers Rule 506.
10
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506 provides the operative exemption for the vast majority of private
placements conducted under Regulation D.60 Rule 506 exempts 
unlimited securities sales to accredited investors and up to 35 non-
accredited investors who demonstrate sophistication in business and 
financial matters.61 In 2013, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups (JOBS) Act, which added Securities Act Section 
4(b) and allowed the SEC to adopt Rule 506(c).62 The new provision 
removes the preexisting ban on general advertising that applied to 
Rule 506 (now referred to as Rule 506(b)), but it also requires that all 
Rule 506(c) offerings involve exclusively accredited investors.63
Despite the fact that Rule 505, Rule 506(b), and the general 4(a)(2) 
exemptions all permit a small number of non-accredited investors, 
less than ten percent of Regulation D offerings involve non-
accredited investors.64 Consequently, the securities laws presently 
restrict virtually all private placements to accredited investors. 
Based on the SEC’s own estimates, in 2010 there were 
approximately $1 trillion of registered securities offerings (public 
debt and public equity) and approximately $1 trillion of exempt 
securities offerings.65 These statistics reveal that, based on the net 
worth standard, approximately 92.6 percent of Americans do not 
have the ability to invest in half of the securities offered for sale each 
year.66 Using the net income standard produces an even starker 
picture: about 95 percent of the investing public remains excluded 
from purchasing half the securities offered each year. Given the 
growth of private placements at the expense of IPOs,67 the present 
situation will mean fewer investment options for middle class 
                                                          
60 See Disqualification of Bad Actors, supra note 34, at 44756.
61 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b). The non-accredited investors must receive a private 
placement memorandum with similar requirements as a registration statement. 17 
C.F.R. § 230.502(b). 
62 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
63 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c); see also Eliminating the Prohibition Against General 
Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, SEC 
Release 33-9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44771 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 230, 239, 242) [hereinafter SEC Release 33-9415].
64 SEC Release 33-9415, supra note 63. This is likely because Rule 502 requires that 
non-accredited investors in offers exempt under Regulation D receive a detailed 
private placement memorandum that mirrors a registration statement, thereby 
vitiating the advantage to issuers of avoiding Securities Act registration. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.502(b).
65 Disqualification of Bad Actors, supra note 34, at 44754.
66 Id. at 44756.
67 Id. at 44754; Lee, supra note 16, at 1006-06.
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Americans and even greater capital appreciation opportunities for the 
already wealthy.
B. Investment Company Act Section 3(c)(7) and the 
Qualified Purchaser 
In addition to qualifying for an exemption from Securities 
Act registration, private investment funds must also qualify for an 
exemption from the Investment Company Act, which requires that 
all investment companies register with the SEC and places limits on 
investment companies’ activities. 68 The Investment Company Act, 
however, exempts from its definition of an investment company a 
number of entities.69 The original private fund exception, section 
3(c)(1), excludes from the definition of investment company funds 
owned by not more than 100 beneficial owners and not publicly 
offered.70 Originally, the intent of section 3(c)(1) was to exclude 
investment companies so small that federal regulation appeared 
unnecessary, 71 but the 100 beneficial owner cap left this provision 
with limited utility.72
With the intent of promoting regulatory simplicity, easing 
compliance costs for investment companies, and encouraging novel 
investment products,73 the National Securities Markets Improvement 
Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”) modified section 3(c)(1) and, much more 
significantly, added the section 3(c)(7) exemption.74 Section 3(c)(7) 
                                                          
68 Investment Company Act § 8. 
69 Id. § 3(b)-(c). Section 3(a) defines as an investment company any issuer of 
securities whose primary business (or intended future business) is investing, 
reinvesting, or trading in securities, whether on its own behalf or on the behalf of 
others. Id. § 3(a)(1)(A). 
70 Id. § 3(c)(1).
71 Investment Company Act Amendments of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1495 Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecomm. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 15 
(1995) (statement of Barry P. Barbash, Director, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. Div. of Inv. 
Mgmt.)[hereinafter NSMIA Hearings]. As the financial markets developed, this 
exception began to cover entities established for the sole purpose of investing in an 
emerging company, syndicated loan entities, or entities established solely to serve as 
acquisition vehicles. Id. at 17.
72 Id. at 15; see also Investment Company Act § 3(c)(1)(A). The Investment 
Company Act also contained a “look-through” provision, whereby if an entity 
owned 10 percent or more of the investment company, the shareholders of the entity 
were included as beneficial owners of the investment company. Id.
73 NSMIA Hearings, supra note 71, at 4-5.
74 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 
209, 110 Stat. 3416, 3432-36, (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)).
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exempts entities that would otherwise meet the definition of an 
investment company if such companies are owned entirely by 
“qualified purchasers.”75 Qualified purchasers, as defined in section 
2(a)(51), are certain institutions and natural persons that own more 
than $5 million in investments.76 As with the definition of accredited 
investor, the qualified purchaser definition sought to cover 
“financially sophisticated investors . . . in a position to appreciate the 
risks associated with investment pools that do not have the 
Investment Company Act's protections.”77 The drafters of NSMIA 
conceded from the very beginning that the section 3(c)(7) exemption 
would cause the considerable growth of so-called “hedge funds” and 
other private investment funds, broadening significantly the size of 
the private placement market.78 Section 3(c)(7), which imposed no 
cap on the number of beneficial owners, ultimately made the section 
3(c)(1) exemption irrelevant.79
The exemptions in the Investment Company Act and the 
Securities Act inherently work in tandem. Any investment company 
must sell its own securities in order to raise capital and therefore it 
must either register such offering or meet an exemption from the 
Securities Act. As section 3(c)(7) contemplates securities not part of 
any “public offering,”80 the prospective purchasers of interests in 
private funds must meet the qualifications of an accredited investor 
under Regulation D as well as the qualifications of a qualified 
purchaser.81
                                                          
75 Investment Company Act § 3(c)(7).
76 Id. § 2(a)(51)(A). Investment Company Act Rule 2a51-1 defines “investments” to 
include securities, equity in private companies owned and operated by the investor, 
equity in real estate other than a primary residence, commodity interests, derivatives 
and other financial contracts, certificate deposits and similar instruments, and the 
cash value of certain insurance policies. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-1 (2014). 
77 NSMIA Hearings, supra note 71, at 16.
78 Id. at 15-18.
79 See Justin Asbury Dillmore, Comment, Leap Before You Look: The SEC’s 
Approach to Hedge Fund Regulation, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 169, 176 (2006) (citing
Erik J. Greupner, Comment, Hedge Funds Are Headed Down-Market: A Call for 
Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555, 1561-62 (2003)).
80 Investment Company Act § 3(c)(7).
81 See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 
3 (2006). Given that the qualified purchaser standard is much more stringent than 
the accredited investor standard, it is difficult to envision a scenario whereby a 
qualified purchaser would not also be an accredited investor.
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C. Secondary Market Transfers and Rule 144
The Securities Act’s requirements apply not only to the 
initial offer and sale of securities but also to the subsequent resale of 
securities on secondary markets. Consequently, the resale limitations 
imposed by Securities Act Rule 502(d) cover all private 
placements.82 Rule 502(d) states that the owner of securities acquired 
in any private offering cannot resell such securities without either 
registering the resale or meeting the requirements of an exemption 
from registration.83 The most common exemption for a resale of 
restricted securities is section 4(a)(1) involving “transactions by any 
person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.”84
Securities Act Rule 144 provides a safe harbor for the 
definition of “underwriter,” consequently providing an exemption 
from registration for resale of restricted securities.85 So long as the 
original issuer is still a private issuer and not subject to the ongoing 
reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,  a 
minimum of one year must lapse after the purchase of the security 
prior to resale.86 If the security is of a private issuer that has 
subsequently become a public company or become subject to the 
reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, then 
Rule 144 reduces the minimum holding period to only six months.87
The most significant consequence of Rule 144 is illiquidity; investors 
in private placements cannot sell their interests without first 
satisfying the minimum holding period.
III. THE ADVANTAGE OF PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
The provisions of the Securities Act and the Investment 
Company Act that restrict private placements to qualified purchasers 
and accredited investors not only inhibit investor choice, they also 
affect the potential total returns investors are capable of earning. 
                                                          
82 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2014). 
83 Id. 
84 Securities Act § 4(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77a- to -aa (2012).
85 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
86 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii). If the purchaser seeking to resell a security is an 
affiliate of the issuer, current public information about the issuer must be available. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(2),(c). The rule also restricts the number of securities an 
affiliate can sell at any time. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(2),(e).
87 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(i). Restrictions on sales by affiliates still apply. 17 
C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(2), (c), (e). 
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Even while long-term returns from most private placements 
ultimately remain lower than the potential returns on public 
securities,88 private placements have certain advantages over public 
securities that result in either greater stability or potentially 
spectacular returns. The significant advantages of many private 
investment products include isolation from market risk, price-
advantageous early entry into emerging companies, unique trading 
strategies that preserve principal, and the ability to interact with 
extraordinary market events. This Part will discuss the advantages of 
both forms of private placements denied to average investors—direct 
investments in private companies and investments in private 
investment funds.
A. Direct Investments in Private Companies 
The analysis that follows will focus primarily on one form of 
exempt offering the Securities Act seeks to restrict to wealthy
investors: “angel” investments in emerging companies. Although this 
analysis will focus on the inherent advantages of angel investments, 
many of these same advantages would likewise apply to other direct 
private investments, including, for example, Rule 701 offerings,89 or 
investments in established private companies.90 This analysis will 
discuss two major advantages of angel investments: (1) investors 
may benefit through early investments in emerging companies that 
either subsequently go public or become targets in an acquisition; 
and (2) because private securities are not listed on a public securities 
exchange, they are isolated to a considerable degree from market 
risk. 
                                                          
88 See Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial 
Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 306 (2009).
89 Securities Act Rule 701 is an exemption from the Securities Act for securities 
issued pursuant to employee compensation programs and is therefore a form of 
private investment not restricted to Accredited Investors. Employees able to 
participate in such offerings are able to take advantage of the numerous features that 
make these offerings advantageous despite not being among the elite Accredited 
Investors and Qualified Purchasers. Employees, however, can only purchase or 
receive the securities of their own employer, or their employer’s parent corporation, 
and thus the exception is extremely limited and provides few diversification options 
for investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701.
90 For example, investors in American Express or Alibaba in the months prior to 
their respective IPOs would have received the same investment benefits as early 
angel investors in companies such as Twitter or Facebook. See infra sources cited 
and text accompanying notes 93-95.
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Most investment in early stage companies comes through 
angel investments, relatively small investments made by individual 
accredited investors.91 Early entry by angel investors into emerging 
companies provides these investors the opportunity to earn multiples 
on their investment not generally possible with public securities. 
These returns are possible because the market itself values public 
securities and (absent insider trading) all market participants make 
investment decisions using the same information, whereas the market 
possesses little to no information about private securities. The lack of 
public information leads to imperfect pricing of private securities, 
often with a discount either for illiquidity92 or for issuer cost 
savings.93 The often superficially low entry point into private 
securities only multiplies the potential returns investors enjoy upon 
ultimate liquidation of their position. 
Law professor Usha Rodrigues uses the Facebook IPO as an 
example of this phenomenon, noting, “[s]ome accredited investors 
bought into Facebook early at remarkably low prices, ranging from 
$1.11 to $9.82 per share, and enjoyed tremendous returns when the 
IPO occurred . . .94 Even absent an IPO, angel investors can often 
enjoy similar returns through a control premium offered by a venture 
capitalist, a private equity fund, or a strategic buyer that 
subsequently acquires the issuer.95 In either instance, angel investing 
presents the possibility to accredited investors of huge return 
multiples not available to average investors restricted to the public 
markets. 
Angel investments, in addition to earning potentially 
spectacular return multiples, are less susceptible to price fluctuations 
because they are isolated from market risk. Houman Shadab, 
research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University 
and advocate for expanded investor access to private placements, 
states that there are two basic kinds of investment risk: idiosyncratic 
                                                          
91 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3397.
92 Id. at 3393 (“[A] vibrant secondary market increases the price that shares will 
fetch on the primary market; the possibility of resale increases the price of a 
product.”).
93 Lee, supra note 16, at 1006.
94 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3392. Facebook closed at $38.23 the first day of 
public trading, representing a return of investment of 26 percent on the $9.82 price 
and of 3,444 percent on the $1.11 price. Id. at 3391-92. Rodrigues also notes that 
“the very last investors overpaid relative to the IPO price, with the final private 
auctions closing above $40 per share.” Id. at 3392.
95 Id. at 3398, 3406-07.
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risk and market risk.96 Idiosyncratic risk, the risk of a particular 
investment losing most or all of its value, arises out of the character 
of the particular investment.97 This is the risk the federal securities 
laws are concerned about when limiting who can invest in private 
securities offerings.98 Market risk, on the other hand, describes the 
possibility that the value of an investment will change based upon 
the conditions of the entire market.99
All investments contain some degree of idiosyncratic risk. 
Most private placements, however, are immune to many forms of 
market risk while public securities are not.100 The business 
fundamentals and long-term prospects of a public company may be 
favorable, but the stock price may nevertheless plummet during a 
market sell-off because the price will follow broader market trends. 
Owners of illiquid private securities, however, cannot readily sell 
their interests on a market.101 Consequently, public markets do not 
continually revalue private securities the way they do public stocks,
isolating them from market risk. 
Proponents of narrow private placement exemptions, 
however, often mention this illiquidity as a significant risk.102
Investors in private placements who need to convert their securities 
into cash may discover that they cannot sell their securities due to the 
restrictions of Rule 144,103 may have to sell their securities at a 
substantial loss,104 or find themselves without a market for the 
securities altogether. This predicament helps explain why the federal 
securities laws focus so heavily on wealth as a gateway for access to 
private placements. Wealthier investors can tie-up greater amounts of 
their capital in illiquid investments because they are likely to have 
sufficient liquid investments to meet unexpected cash 
requirements.105 On the other hand, nothing prevents wealthy 
investors from committing an excessive percentage of their capital to 
illiquid investments and finding themselves in the same position as
                                                          
96 Shadab, supra note 88, at 265.
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g., SEC Release 8766, supra note 10, at 7; see also Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
99 Shadab, supra note 88, at 266.
100 Id.
101 See supra Part II.C.
102 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3428; see also Lee, supra note 16, at 993.  
103 See supra Part II.C.; see also Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3405.
104 Lee, supra note 16, at 993.
105 Id. at 993-95.
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any other investor.106 Likewise, an intelligent average investor could 
invest a proportionate amount of their capital in illiquid investments 
such that they could satisfy unexpected cash needs with other liquid 
investments. 
In addition, emerging secondary markets for private 
securities like SecondMarket and SharesPost have partially resolved 
the illiquidity risks by providing a means for investors in private 
securities to find potential buyers.107 With secondary markets for 
private securities, investors in private offerings have the opportunity 
to liquidate private securities, valued outside the vicissitudes of the 
public markets, in lieu of public equities. Right now, however, these 
secondary markets remain restricted to only accredited investors.108
Consequently, during times of market stress, wealthy accredited 
investors besought with sudden cash needs possess the unique ability 
to sell private securities (potentially at a gain or more limited loss) 
while investors restricted to the public markets can only sell at a loss. 
Even though angel investments benefit from lower market 
risk, they come with a high level of idiosyncratic risk. Illiquidity and 
the lack of market information only amplify this risk.109
Approximately two-thirds of all angel investments ultimately lose 
most or all of their value.110 At the same time, these same features of 
angel investments—illiquidity and lack of market information—
allow them to generate returns many times their original basis.111
This interaction of risks and rewards results in an average aggregate
return of approximately ten percent, assuming appropriate 
diversification among many angel investment options.112 By way of 
comparison, the average return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 index 
from 1980 to present was 13.06 percent and the return on bonds—
often considered an important portfolio diversification tool for 
                                                          
106 Id.
107 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3402-06. The market exchanges undertake efforts to 
ensure that investors comply with Rule 144 and Regulation D.
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 3428.
110 Id. at 3398 (citing Robert Wiltbank, At the Individual Level: Outlining Angel 
Investing in the United States (Feb. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://perma.cc/V3R2-7WN4).
111 See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 93-95.
112 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3398 (citing Robert Wiltbank, At the Individual 
Level: Outlining Angel Investing in the United States (Feb. 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/K3J8-NKKD.
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investors—was 8.43 percent over that same period. 113 Given these 
returns, and the emerging secondary markets, the illiquidity and 
idiosyncratic risk of private placements alone do not justify 
government actions that restrict the fundamental freedom of the 
investor.
B. Private Investment Funds
Private investment funds provide many of the same 
advantages to their investors as do other private placements. Their 
unique structure also provides several additional benefits to investors 
that direct investments in private companies do not. Although the 
idiosyncratic risks and general risk profiles of each hedge fund, 
private equity fund, and venture capital fund vary considerably, they 
all enjoy certain distinct advantages over their cousin, the registered 
investment fund. Besides the inherent advantages of pooled 
investment funds—risk spreading and the pooling of capital to 
generate higher returns through a larger market footprint—private
funds, because of their exemption from the Investment Company 
Act, can adopt trading strategies to preserve wealth in times of 
market stress. Additionally, private funds often focus on niche 
investment markets and strategies generally foreclosed to mutual
funds. Finally, these funds’ legal structure allows for pass-through 
taxation, which preserves investors’ capital and contributes to higher 
returns. 
One of the most significant objectives of many private funds 
is principle preservation.114 This advantage applies especially to
hedge funds.115 Hedge funds utilize trading strategies and hedging 
techniques denied to registered mutual funds by the Investment 
Company Act116 to protect principal during times of high market 
risk.117 Among other requirements, the Investment Company Act 
requires registered funds to offset any short positions with 
                                                          
113 Investment returns calculated based on data from sources cited infra notes 169-
175.
114 In fact, most private equity fund investors demand a specified minimum rate of 
return. See, e.g., Aaron Bachik & Anthony Broglio, Raising Equity in the 
Construction Industry, CONSTRUCTION ACCT. AND TAX’N, 2000 WL 36565759 
(“Investors in private equity funds typically demand returns between 25 percent and 
35 percent. If an investment cannot generate such returns, regardless of its risk 
profile, the equity sponsors will not make the investment.”).
115 SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 5.
116 Shadab, supra note 88, at 269.
117 Id.
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corresponding long positions.118 Exemption from the Investment 
Company Act frees hedge funds from this requirement, allowing 
them to hedge long positions by simultaneously holding both short 
and long positions on the same securities.119 Hedge funds often 
utilize short selling,120 arbitrage,121 and margin trading122 to amplify 
returns and preserve principal. In addition to hedging against the 
idiosyncratic risk of securities to reduce losses, these trading 
strategies also generate returns in declining markets because funds 
can realize gains from arbitrage, margin trading, and short selling 
irrespective of market conditions.123
By employing these trading strategies, “hedge funds are 
uniquely able to reduce losses from market risk.”124 In contrast, 
public mutual funds, “typically seek returns relative to the overall 
market.”125 Consequently, “during economic downturns mutual 
funds typically remain invested in securities even as they continue to 
decrease in value.”126 These trends result in almost no correlation 
between public market returns and hedge fund returns, particularly in 
times of market stress.127 Even though the returns on public equity 
markets remain higher than returns on hedge funds, the high returns 
on public funds come with added exposure to market risk.128 From 
1999 to 2002, when public equity markets, as demonstrated by the 
S&P 500, were in sharp decline and yielding negative returns as low 
                                                          
118 Id.
119 Id. at 270.
120 Goldstein, supra note 24, at 116. Funds accomplish short selling by borrowing a 
security from a broker-dealer or market maker, selling the security, and then 
repurchasing the security at a lower price. The fund then returns the security to the 
broker-dealer, realizing the difference. See, e.g., Introduction to the Markets: How 
the Markets Work: Stock Purchases and Sales: Long and Short, INVESTOR.GOV,
http://perma.cc/K3R4-MBXB (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
121 Id. Arbitrage involves taking advantage of the unexpected price difference of a 
security on two markets, buying the security for a low price on one market and 
selling it at a higher price on another. See, e.g., Investor Bulletin: Exchange Traded 
Funds (ETFs), INVESTOR.GOV, http://perma.cc/9F77-3SLZ (last visited Nov. 14, 
2014).
122 Id. Margin trading refers to purchasing a security using a loan from the seller 
guaranteed by the proceeds from the future sale of the security. See, e.g., Investor 
Bulletin: Understanding Margin Accounts, INVESTOR.GOV, http://perma.cc/2ZAL-
RD3L (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
123 Shadab, supra note 88, at 270.
124 Id. 
125 Id.
126 Id. at 269.
127 See infra Part IV.A.
128 Shadab, supra note 88, at 269.
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as –20 percent or more, hedge funds in fact maintained positive 
returns.129
In addition to principal preservation and low market risk, 
another major advantage of private funds is their ability to focus on
niche markets and take advantage of timing opportunities. For 
instance, venture capital funds and private equity funds often invest 
in motion picture productions and hedge funds trade in complex 
derivatives.130 Public mutual funds, by comparison, are entirely 
absent from these markets. The managers of private funds are often 
activist investors as opposed to the largely passive managers of 
registered mutual funds.131 Activist investors use their share control 
of a portfolio company to prod management to make changes to 
increase the portfolio company’s value, eventually passing the gains 
from activism onto the funds’ investors.132 Successful activist fund 
managers, particularly of private equity funds, can often acquire 
drastically undervalued portfolio companies and return many times 
their value by the time they exit the investment.133
Private funds also realize high returns by interacting with 
extraordinary events such as mergers and bankruptcies. Hedge funds 
often arbitrage the price of a public security during a tender offer or 
during bankruptcy.134 Fund managers sometimes even instigate 
tender offers, frequently hostile, to either gain control of a target 
company or arbitrage the stock price.135 The typical modus operandi
                                                          
129 Id. at 290.
130 Id. at 263.
131 Id. at 270-71.
132 Id. This perhaps explains why only private funds focus on niche markets like 
emerging companies and film productions—the higher risk of failure motivates the 
fund manager to take a much more active role in the portfolio company in order to 
protect their investment.  
133 Id. 
134 Id.
135 Or perhaps both. For example, activist investor William Ackman, through his 
hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management L.P. and its subsidiaries PS 
Management G.P., PS Fund 1 LLC, and AGMS, Inc., acquired large amounts of 
stock in Allergan, Inc., while at the same time financing the tender offer of Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., for Allergan stock. Evidently, Ackman sought 
his shares both (1) to gain enough voting power to force Allergan to accept the 
tender offer and (2) sell his shares to Valeant if the tender offer succeeded. 
Complaint at 13-18, Allergan, Inc. v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals, Int’l, Inc., No. 8:14-
cv-01214, 2014 WL 3809192 (C.D. CA, Nov. 1, 2014). When Actavis emerged as a 
white knight and topped the Valeant bid, Ackman’s hedge fund remained able to sell 
its Allegan stock to Actavis for a considerable profit (and without having to expend 
capital financing the Valeant bid). See Antoine Gara, Allergan Agrees to $219 A 
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of a private equity fund is to gain control of a company through a 
leveraged buyout, then repay the acquisition debt out of the free cash 
flow of the acquired company.136 When the fund exits the 
investment, only minimal debt will remain, leaving investors free to 
realize large returns (and preserving investors’ capital relatively risk-
free during the period the private equity fund retains ownership of 
the portfolio company).137 Venture capital funds typically acquire 
early-stage companies and exercise an activist investing strategy, 
hoping to improve the value of the portfolio company by providing 
management advice and other support.138 The market often views 
venture capital investments as “smart money,” and the mere fact of a 
venture capital fund investment may increase the purported value of 
the target.139 Successful venture capital funds frequently provide 
investor returns ranging from 16 to 20 percent per year140—higher 
than the 13 percent average annual yield on the S&P 500.141
Public markets often find themselves the inevitable losers 
when private funds engage in investment arbitrage or take companies 
private.142 If a fund succeeds in acquiring a publicly traded company, 
average investors (restricted to public markets) realize the control 
premium or the market price upswing prior to the acquisition, but do 
not share in the subsequent gains the fund realizes.143 Only the fund 
investors—accredited investors and qualified purchasers—receive 
the benefit of subsequent gains after funds improve the portfolio 
company’s profitability.144 When tender offers or leveraged buyouts 
fail, however, the price of the once-target typically plummets, 
punishing average investors. Meanwhile, the principal of the hedge 
fund or private equity fund remains unaltered. This dynamic is even 
worse looking at venture capital funds, because their target 
companies are rarely public and average investors do not even 
realize a control premium.145 Consequently, only the securities laws’ 
                                                                                                                           
Share Actavis Takeover Over Bill Ackman-Backed Valeant Deal, FORBES, available 
at http://perma.cc/99FK-FEL4 (Nov. 17, 2014).
136 See SIMON M. LORNE & JOY MARLENE BRYAN, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS:
NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § 6:2-3 (2014). 
137 Id.
138 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3400-01.
139 Id. at 3401.
140 Id.
141 Calculated based on data from sources cited infra note 169.
142 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3429.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 93-95.
22
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 15 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol15/iss2/1
Spring] Giving the Average Investor the Keys to the Kingdom 23
investing elite ever participate in the successful venture capital 
investment.146 The result is a situation whereby, “average investors 
are net losers . . . because of government regulation they cannot 
participate in the profits that private equity funds make, while 
nevertheless must share in the losses.”147
Another major advantage of private funds is pass-through 
taxation. Most private funds choose the limited partnership or the 
LLC as their corporate form.148 As partnerships, the investment 
funds themselves do not pay taxes.149 Rather, the funds impute their 
earnings to their beneficial owners, who pay taxes at their individual 
levels.150 This structure avoids the “double-taxation” problem of 
public corporations,151 allowing funds to pass the tax savings on to 
investors in the form of higher net returns.152 Many private equity 
fund investors are tax-neutral or tax-exempt entities like public 
pension plans or government treasuries,153 meaning that some fund 
earnings escape taxation altogether!
The SEC, meanwhile, characterizes many of the significant 
advantages of private funds as reasons to lock average investors out 
of making investments. 154 This perspective derives from the 
fundamental premise of the federal securities laws that disclosure of
information is the best mechanism for protecting investors from 
fraud.155 From an investor standpoint, illiquidity is the major 
drawback to private funds. To generate their large yields on portfolio 
companies, venture capital funds and private equity funds have exit 
                                                          
146 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3429.
147 Id.
148 Goldstein, supra note 26, at 114-15.
149 See generally SCOTT SHIMICK, 8 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §
33:03-14 (2014).
150 Id.
151 Id. “Double taxation” refers to the fact the corporation pays income taxes and its 
investors subsequently pay taxes on dividends and other distributions, taxing the 
earnings twice.
152 Goldstein, supra note 26, at 114-15. 
153 The “Prudent Man Rule” Clarification of 1979 clarified that government 
treasuries and pension funds could participate in private placements and alternative 
investments. See 44 Fed. Reg. 37,221, 37,222 (June 26, 1979). Since then, the 
number of large pension programs investing in private equity has exploded. For 
instance, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) has $5.6 
billion assets under management devoted to private equity as of 2013. CALPERS,
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORTS (2013), available at 
http://perma.cc/6BZ9-8HRM.
154 Goldstein, supra note 26, at 114-15. 
155 SEC Release 8766, supra note 10, at 8.
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horizons of five to ten years after the initial investment.156 Even 
though the investment strategy of hedge funds does not necessarily 
rely on taking such extremely long positions, hedge funds 
nevertheless restrict the ability of investors to redeem and transfer 
their interests.157 As discussed previously, however, illiquidity is, in 
some cases, extremely advantageous to the properly diversified 
portfolio.158
As with angel investments, private funds come with high 
levels of idiosyncratic risk.159 In the rare cases when hedge fund 
losses are actually negative, they can be jaw dropping.160 These 
potential losses are one reason why the SEC believes private funds 
should remain restricted to a limited number of wealthy, 
sophisticated investors.161 At the same time, the fact that many 
extremely sophisticated institutional investors have lost millions in 
private funds evidences why they are not necessarily worthy to have 
their own special kingdom of exclusive, private investments.162 The 
                                                          
156 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3401; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, 7-8 (2003).
157 Shadab, supra note 88, at 250-51.
158 See supra Part II.A.
159 Shadab, supra note 88, at 274.
160 Id. For instance, during the 2008 financial crisis, IKB Deutsche Industriebank (a 
German bank) and ACA Capital Management (a U.S. money manager) suffered 
losses of $150 million and $841 million on a collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) 
tied to derivative swaps involving mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”). Oguss, 
supra note 14, at 305-06. Paulson & Co., a hedge fund, had marketed the CDO 
(through Goldman-Sachs, which lost $100 million), but failed to disclose the fact 
that the hedge fund was shorting the MBS market at the same time. Id. Five 
Wisconsin school district pension funds invested in hedge funds also collectively 
lost $37 million on CDOs tied to MBS in 2008. Id. at 307. In the mid-1990s, several 
large institutional investors, including Orange County California, Proctor & Gamble, 
and Gibson Greetings, suffered losses of as much as $157 million on derivative 
swaps marketed by various hedge funds. Id. at 302. Famously, thousands of 
investors in Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, which Madoff marketed as an exempt 
pooled investment program, lost a staggering $64.8 billion. Smith, supra note 14, at 
218-19. Most of the investors in Madoff’s funds were sophisticated investors or 
accredited investors and included many mutual fund and hedge fund managers and 
philanthropic entities. Id. at 232-33. At the same time, some of the investors were 
reasonably average individuals with income and net worth levels barely past the 
minimum thresholds for Accredited Investor and Qualified Purchaser qualification. 
Id. at 233-34.
161 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 16, at 990-91; SEC Release 8766, supra note 10, at 7-9.
162 Smith, supra note 14, at 220 (“In light of these developments, policy makers 
should re-examine the wisdom of continued reliance on the statutory model that 
leaves sophisticated investors to fend for themselves”). The losses from the Paulson 
CDO collapse and the Madoff Ponzi scheme resulted from blatant fraud. Id. at 215-
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fact remains that any poorly diversified investor can potentially lose 
their entire investment—whether that investment is in public or 
private investment instruments.163
While these concerns do make private funds 
idiosyncratically risky, they also provide many noted advantages to 
investors that public securities do not. All investing involves some 
degree of risk. The securities laws, therefore, should “enable all 
investors . . . to participate in capital markets according to the 
particular investor's choice and tolerance for risk.”164 To do
otherwise is to perpetuate a regime that will invariably result in a 
greater separation between those admitted inside the gates of the 
private placement kingdom and those locked outside.
IV. HOW THE ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE PLACEMENTS 
FACILITATE WEALTH INEQUALITY
Denying average middle class investors access to private 
placements places them at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis wealthy 
accredited investors and qualified purchasers in two significant 
respects. First, the investment options available to middle class 
investors largely lack the principal preservation capacity that private 
placements possess by virtue of their isolation from market risk165
and the unique trading strategies they employ.166 In times of market 
                                                                                                                           
16; Oguss, supra note 14, at 305-06. For its role in the Paulson CDO collapse, 
Goldman Sachs paid a penalty of $550 million for issuing marketing materials with 
“incomplete information” by virtue of not disclosing Paulson’s fund held both short 
and long positions on MBS. Oguss, supra note 14, at 306. Irving Picard, the 
federally appointed trustee for the Madoff investment recovery, filed lawsuits 
attempting to recover $44.8 million from Madoff’s wife and $10.1 billion that he 
characterized as fictitious profits paid to early investors. Smith, supra note 14, at 
224.  Madoff himself is serving 150 years in federal prison. Id. at 216. Even the 
most robust disclosure regime cannot completely foreclose losses proximately 
caused by fraudulent schemes. See generally Smith, supra note 14. Further, looking 
at the staggering losses of one party only tells half of the story. While the Goldman 
Sachs, IKB, and ACA lost millions on derivative swaps, Paulson’s hedge fund—and 
its investors—made over $1 billion on the same swaps. Oguss, supra note 14, at 
306.
163 See generally Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3428; Houman B. Shadab, Fending 
for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 251, 269-70 (2008); Shadab, The Law and Economics of 
Hedge Funds, supra note 88, at 264.
164 Smith, supra note 14, at 282-83.
165 See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 100-06.
166 See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 114-41.
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stress, greater preserved principal allows many private placements to 
realize higher cumulative return multiples than public equities, even 
accounting for illiquidity. Second, the principal preservation tools 
that are available to average investors—such as the bond markets 
and treasury notes—are poor portfolio diversification instruments 
relative to private placements.  Middle class investors are therefore 
unable to adequately maximize risk-adjusted returns. This Part will 
first compare private and public investment returns with a particular 
focus on the effects of principal preservation in times of market 
stress. The analysis will then proceed to discuss the inequities 
implicit in denying average investors greater diversification options. 
Finally, this Part will outline the current and historical number of 
accredited investors and qualified purchasers and explain how 
private placement investment returns permit these groups to 
accumulate greater wealth than the middle class. 
A. Private Placement and Public Market Returns 
Compared
In the aggregate, the public stock markets tend to outperform 
private securities.167 Of the six asset classes examined below—public 
stocks, bonds, ten-year treasury bonds, hedge funds, private equity 
funds, and venture capital funds—only private equity funds and 
venture capital funds yield higher average returns than public 
equities.168 Presently, the securities laws limit non-accredited 
investors seeking investments with steady returns and relatively low 
market risk to public debt and treasury notes, both of which provide 
only modest inflation-adjusted returns on investment. Qualified 
purchasers, meanwhile, can diversify their portfolios by investing in 
hedge funds, with higher inflation-adjusted returns than public debt 
and lower market risk than public equity. They also have the 
opportunity to earn steady—and sometimes spectacular—returns by 
investing in private equity funds and venture capital funds. The chart 
below compares the returns of public stocks (represented by the S&P 
500 Index), bonds, the ten-year U.S. Treasury Note, hedge funds, 
private equity funds, and venture capital funds from 1997 to 2013. 
                                                          
167 Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds, supra note 88, at 269.
168 See infra sources cited and text accompanying notes 169-75. 
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Even though annualized private fund returns on balance tend 
to be lower than public markets, they are usually steady and rarely 
negative. For example, from 1998 to 2013, hedge funds had only two 
years of negative returns.176 A similar picture emerges for private 
equity and venture capital funds. From 1997 to 2013, venture capital 
funds and private equity funds each had only four years of negative 
                                                          
169 Calculated based on data from ANNUAL RETURNS ON STOCK, T. BONDS, AND T.




172 Calculated based on the Barclay’s Fund of Hedge Fund Index, BARCLAYHEDGE 
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT DATABASES, available at http://perma.cc/XYD7-7J3D 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2014)). Data is not available for years prior to 1997.
173 Calculated based on data from Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven N. 
Kaplan, Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know? J. OF FIN. 33-34 (July 
2013) supplemented by returns provided by CALPERS, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL 
FINANCIAL REPORTS (2001-2014), available at http://perma.cc/FKB3-HGV3; and 
returns provided by WASHINGTON STATE INVESTMENT BOARD, PORTFOLIO 
OVERVIEW BY STRATEGY (2003-2014), available at http://perma.cc/SV75-Y8R3. See 
Appendix B for the methodology used to imply annual returns for private equity 
funds.   
174 Id. See Appendix C for the methodology used to imply annual returns for venture 
capital.
175 To determine this figure, the theoretical one-year return of a $1,000 initial 
investment was calculated and then adjusted for inflation. The result was then
reinvested and the return for the following year computed and adjusted for inflation, 
the process continuing through the final year. Annual returns were based on data 
provided in sources cited supra notes 174-79. Inflation based on the consumer price 
index, annual data provided by U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://perma.cc/48LT-
V7Q9 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
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returns.177 The infrequent occurrence of negative returns allows 
private funds to preserve principal, resulting in greater compounding 
relative to public markets and consequently higher aggregate return 
multiples
Principal preservation and subsequent compounding 
facilitate wealth accumulation for those select few able to invest in 
private funds. A simple data analysis of two periods of public market 
downturns—the technology bubble collapse in the late-1990s and the 
financial crisis of 2008—demonstrates this outcome. Exhibit 1 
provides the average annual returns on five asset classes from 
1997—just before the peak of the technology bubble—until 2005 
when the public financial markets began to recover in earnest.178
From 1997 to 1999, the S&P 500 posted declining annual returns, 
and outright negative returns from 2000 to 2002.179 Meanwhile, 
private fund returns (except venture capital) remained largely 
positive up until 2002 (and even saw increasing returns while public 
market returns declined).180 Returns on venture capital funds, due to 
their heavy investment in the technology bubble, declined from 
almost 100 percent in 1998 to negative -15.23 percent in 2000.181
Hedge fund returns over the period remained both positive and 
relatively constant.182 From 1998 to 2003, every investment class 
spare venture capital funds outperformed public debt.183 Until 
markets recovered in 2003, private funds continued to generate 
higher annual returns than public equities, demonstrating their capital 
preservation abilities.184 The fact that fluctuations in private fund 
returns bear little connection to broader market trends demonstrates 
that private investments are in fact isolated from market risk.185









185 See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 93-95.
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The direct connection to wealth accumulation becomes 
apparent when looking at the compounding power of principal 
preservation. Exhibit 2 demonstrates the theoretical growth (or 
decline) in the value of a $1,000 investment made in each public 
equity, public debt, and private funds in 1997.186 An investment in 
public markets posts a positive total return of 93 percent, despite 
negative returns and corresponding principal loss from 2000 to 
2002.187 An investment in a private fund, however, generates return 
on investment of at least 180 percent over the same period.188
Venture capital funds, despite steep declines in returns and years 
with returns below zero, still left the second-highest amount of 
capital for investors.189 Every asset class, meanwhile, outperformed 
public debt.190 These results demonstrate the unique power that 
wealthy qualified purchasers have to retain and grow wealth relative 
to the market at large. 
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The 2008 financial crisis provides an even more 
demonstrative case study because of the behavior of private fund 
returns. Unlike in 1999, when the technology bubble collapse barely 
affected private funds (except for venture capital), they did not 
emerge unscathed from the 2008 financial crisis.191 Hedge fund 
returns from 2006 to 2013 closely tracked public market returns, 
mainly because of their heavy exposure to the mortgage-backed 
securities (“MBS”) at the root of the financial collapse.192 Their 
exposure to MBS, however, remained lower than the exposure of 
public markets to MBS.193 This lower exposure is why, despite 
posting record losses, hedge funds still posted higher returns than 
public markets and their performance relative to public markets was 
at an all-time high.194 Private equity funds and venture capital funds 
posted highly erratic returns over this period, although any losses 
they suffered were insignificant compared to the over one-third 
decline in the value of public markets over this period.195
                  
191 Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds, supra note 88, at 291-92 (“In 
2008, hedge funds suffered the worst losses in their history. Hedge funds lost 19 




195 Calculated based on data from sources cited supra notes 169-75.
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Exhibit 3 outlines the average returns of public markets and 
private placements from 2006, just before the financial crisis, 
through 2013.196 The power of compounding under these market 
conditions is telling of the problem facing the average investor. 
Despite hedge fund returns roughly tracking public market returns, 
investors in hedge funds retained significantly greater principal than 
public investors. Earlier compounding and slightly smaller losses 
meant that hedge fund investors earned greater return on investment 
even after public markets recovered and posted annual returns higher 
than private funds. The total cumulative return on a public 
investment from 2006 to 2013 was 75 percent, as compared to a 
hedge fund cumulative return of 51 percent or a private equity fund 
return of 102 percent.197 Exhibit 4, showing the theoretical growth of 
a $1,000 investment from 2006 to 2013, graphically depicts the 
resulting wealth accumulation.198
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Exhibits 5 and 6 chart these same effects from 1997 to the 
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present,199 clearly demonstrating the aggregate effects of low market 
risk, capital preservation, and other advantages of private funds. As 
shown by Exhibit 5,200 private placement returns, excepting private 
equity funds, remain on balance lower than public stocks.
Concurrently, Exhibit 6201 shows that of the six asset classes 
examined, a $1,000 investment in 1997 in both hedge funds and 
private equity funds would have left an investor with more capital in 
2013 than a similarly timed investment in public stocks. These
theoretical models assume that investors withdraw no invested 
principal during the measuring period, which means that private 
placements yield higher overall return multiples even accounting for 
their illiquidity. Meanwhile, returns on bonds and treasury securities 
barely outpace inflation.202 These outcomes show that qualified 
purchasers diversified in private placements and public equities will 
drastically outperform non-accredited investors diversified in public 
equities and bonds. This inadequate diversification is the mechanism 
by which wealthy accredited investors and qualified purchasers 
accumulate much greater wealth relative to the middle class. 
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B. The Inequities of Inadequate Portfolio 
Diversification 
Portfolio diversification, the act of spreading investment 
capital among a variety of different asset classes, plays a critical role 
in both maximizing returns and minimizing risks.203 According to 
Shadab:
“Modern portfolio theory” focuses on those returns 
attributable to risk and teaches that investors should 
seek to maximize risk-adjusted returns. . . . Risk-
adjusted returns are maximized when, taking into 
account the different measures of risk, an investor is 
receiving the highest possible return for the total 
amount of risk they are taking on. To maximize risk-
adjusted returns, investors should therefore invest in 
an efficient portfolio that yields the highest return 
for the level of market risk that they are willing to 
bear. 204
Presently, the securities laws deny average investors the opportunity 
to invest in private placements, which also denies them the 
opportunity to diversify sufficiently their portfolios to take advantage 
of differing risk profiles. Although pubic stock markets tend to post 
the highest average annual returns, they also come with the most 
risk.205 At the same time, the securities laws leave non-accredited 
investors seeking to diversify away from public markets only limited 
options, all of which are inferior to private placements. The 
securities laws therefore force middle class investors seeking to 
maximize returns to bear greater risk than they would prefer.   
The risk profile of an investment is often approximated using 
the risk premium, the excess return of a risk-prone investment over a 
“riskless” alternative, typically U.S. treasury notes.206 The table 
below shows the average risk premiums of each public stock 
markets, bonds, angel investments, hedge funds, private equity 
funds, and venture capital funds.207
                                                          
203 Shadab, Fending for Themselves, supra note 163, at 269-70.
204 Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds, supra note 88, at 264.
205 Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds, supra note 88, at 269.
206 See, e.g., Investment Statistics, EVESTMENT, http://perma.cc/5LJ2-ZDDF (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2015). This analysis utilizes the ten-year U.S. Treasury Note as a 
benchmark. 
207 Calculated based on data from sources cited supra notes 169-75.
34
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 15 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol15/iss2/1































Using the S&P 500 as a benchmark, the public equity market 
yields an elevated risk premium of as high as 3.39 percent for the
period of 1997 to present.209 By way of comparison, private 
placement risk premiums vary between one percent and 8.87
percent.210 Bond markets, the traditional method of diversifying 
portfolio risk, yield a negative risk premium of between -2.68
percent and -0.20 percent.211 The negative risk premium on bonds 
means that their average returns are so low that they underperform 
the virtually guaranteed returns on treasury notes and barely keep 
pace with inflation. As shown by Exhibit 6, the 1997 to 2013 
inflation-adjusted returns of every single asset class surpass the bond 
market.212 Middle class investors seeking portfolio diversification 
therefore face a prisoner’s dilemma: either divert capital into the 
underperforming bond market, or remain heavily invested in the
volatile public stock markets. 
Despite this undesirable predicament, the federal securities 
laws indiscriminately allow average investors to “lose their shirts” 213
investing on the public stock markets (and in a variety of other 
ways)214 but lock them out of private markets entirely. In principle, 
the individual investor’s own risk tolerance should determine what 
degree of risk the investor is willing to undertake.215 Taking freedom 
from the individual investor and handing it to the government is at 
                                                          
208 Assumes a 10 percent average return. See Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3398 
(citing Robert Wiltbank, At the Individual Level: Outlining Angel Investing in the 
United States (Feb. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://perma.cc/34X5-K7P3).




213 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3428-29.
214 For instance, no federal law stops anyone from buying hundreds of lottery tickets 
in hopes of winning a Mega Millions or Powerball jackpot, the odds of which are 
significantly worse than the odds of losing money on a private placement.  
215 Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds, supra note 88, at 264.
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best inefficient,216 at worst, proof that Congress does not trust the
middle class. 
C. Left Behind: The Middle Class Relative to the 
Securities Laws’ Investing Elite   
In enacting the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 
1980, Congress sought to restrict private placements to the already 
wealthy,217 ostensibly because they were better able to “fend for 
themselves.”218 Over the following 35 years, however, the unique 
ability of wealthy investors in private placements to amplify 
aggregate returns by preserving principal, coupled with inadequate 
portfolio diversification options for non-accredited investors, has 
permitted these investing elite to become even wealthier relative to 
the middle class. While both the total number of the securities laws’ 
investing elite—accredited investors and qualified purchasers—has 
actually increased, along with their relative proportion of all 
American households, they remain a small fraction of the total 
population. The following table outlines the approximate number of 




















                                                          
216 See Lee, supra note 16, at 997-98, 1000-01.
217 See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 47-51.
218 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-26 (1953).
219 Calculated using statistics from Marvin Schwartz & Barry W. Johnson, Estimates 
of Personal Wealth, 1986, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 71 (1986), available at 
http://perma.cc/V9JQ-NBEM.
220 Calculated using statistics from Barry W. Johnson & Marvin Schwartz, Personal 
Wealth, 1989, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 114 (1989), available at 
http://perma.cc/ZRC4-P7ZK.
221 Calculated using statistics from Barry W. Johnson, Personal Wealth, 1992-1995,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 84 (1995), available at http://perma.cc/P8FU-WXGL.
222 Calculated using statistics from Barry W. Johnson, Personal Wealth, 1995,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 75 (1995), available at http://perma.cc/7K89-L4Z2.
223 Calculated using statistics from Barry W. Johnson & Lisa M. Schreiber, Personal 
Wealth, 1998, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 103 (1998), available at 
http://perma.cc/G87H-RXY8.
224 Calculated using statistics from Barry W. Johnson & Brian G. Raub, Personal 
Wealth, 2001, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 136 (2001), available at 
http://perma.cc/9NPY-63KX.
225 Calculated using statistics from Brian G. Raub, Personal Wealth, 2004,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 298 (2004), available at http://perma.cc/HN2G-KGAV.
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At best, as of 2013, only about 7.4 percent of American 
households qualify as accredited investors and approximately 1.22 
percent as qualified purchasers.228 Based on IRS SOI statistics, from 
1986 to 2007 approximately 1.5 percent of American households 
historically qualified as accredited investors.229 The average 
percentage of Americans meeting the standard for qualified 
purchaser over the same period was, at most, 0.40 percent.230 High 
inflation, the significant increase in the value of personal residences, 
and sustained growth of income in the 1990s resulted in an increase
in the number of individuals qualifying as accredited investors and 
qualified purchasers in the early 2000’s.231 Nevertheless, the 
securities laws still preclude 93 percent of U.S. households from 
investing in all private placements and 99 percent of households 
from investing in private investment funds. 
                                                                                                                           
226 Calculated using statistics from Brian Raub & Joseph Newcomb, Personal 
Wealth, 2007, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 169 (2007), available at
http://perma.cc/2JGL-6X8T.
227 Estimates based on SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis study, see 
Disqualification of Bad Actors, supra note 34, at 44756.
228 Id.
229 Calculated based on IRS SOI statistics. See sources cited supra notes 219-27.
230 Id.
231 SEC Release 8766, supra note 10, at 24. The decline in home values proceeding 
(or perhaps precipitating) the 2007 financial crisis prompted Congress and the SEC 
to exclude primary residences from the Accredited Investor net worth calculation in 
2011. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 413(a) (2010); Net Worth Standard for Accredited 
Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. 81793-02 (Dec. 29, 2011).
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While the securities laws kept the middle class out of private 
placements, the proportion of wealth concentrated in those eligible to 
invest grew. Through 1995, the percentage of total household wealth 
held by the top ten percent of households was approximately 79 
percent.232 This disparity began to increase in 1995 after Congress 
enacted NSMIA, which inaugurated the qualified purchaser standard 
and the dramatic growth of private investment funds.233 As Exhibit 7 
shows, the concentration of wealth in the top ten percent of 
American households (approximately the same percentage of 
households qualifying as accredited investors) has increased 
dramatically—approximately 174 percent—since 1995.234 By 2013, 
the portion of wealth held by the top ten percent had grown to over 
84 percent of all household wealth.235 This growth came largely at 
the expense of the middle two quartiles, which saw their percentage 
of household wealth decline from 7.17 percent in 1995 to 4.54 
percent in 2013.236
Side-by-side comparison of growing wealth concentration 
and private placement returns shows the direct correlation between 
growing wealth disparity and private placement returns. Taking 1997 
                  
232 Calculated based on data from FED. RESERVE SYS., SURVEY OF CONSUMER 
FINANCES (2013), available at http://perma.cc/9RN7-NA6D.
233 See supra Part II.B.
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as a baseline, Exhibit 8 charts four different functions over the period 
of 1998 to 2013. First, it charts the growth in wealth concentration in 
the top ten percent of Americans as a percentage of the wealth held 
by the top ten percent in 1997.237 A result of 191.07 from this 
function indicates that 91.07 percent more wealth was concentrated 
in the top ten percent as compared to 1997. Second, Exhibit 8 gives 
the accumulated excess returns of each of the three classes of private 
funds as against the S&P 500. The excess return is a measure of the 
return realized on an investment greater than an alternative 
benchmark. Here, the cumulative excess return provides the total 
return (over time) of a private investment greater than a similarly 
timed investment in the S&P 500. An aggregate excess return of 
177.92 means that a private fund investment made in 1997 returned 
77.92 percent more than an S&P 500 investment made in 1997. In 
short, the cumulative excess return shows the total capital returned to 
qualified purchasers that the securities laws currently deny to the 
middle class.  
                  
237 Exhibit 8 uses 1997 as a baseline for two reasons. First, confident approximate 
returns are available for all three classes of private funds exist from 1997 to 2013. 
See supra comment to note 174. Second, Congress enacted NSMIA in 1995, which 
created the qualified purchaser standard and caused both the expansion of private 
funds and their exclusive availability to the wealthy. See supra sources cited and 
text accompanying notes 73-76.
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Running Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient238 on the excess 
returns of each class of private funds as compared to the growth in
wealth concentration shows a strong positive correlation between the
two functions. Out of a possible maximum coefficient of 1.0 (perfect 
positive correlation), the correlation between wealth concentration 
and private fund excess returns is at least 0.75. Running a T-Test239
shows that the correlation is statistically significant with a 
confidence level of at least 98 percent. This means that a strong 
statistical relationship exists between private placement excess 
returns and wealth inequality, a relationship that the federal 
securities laws actively enable.240
Correlation between 
wealth concentration and 








Hedge Funds 0.94 99.87%
Private Equity Funds 0.94 99.87%
Venture Capital Funds 0.75 97.95%
By no means is this analysis reductionist; there are 
innumerable reasons for the growth in wealth disparity in the United 
States. At the same time, as French economist Thomas Piketty has 
recently—and famously—elucidated, return on investment 
                                                          
238 See FREEMAN F. ELZEY, A FIRST READER IN STATISTICS 67-70 (Brooks/Cole 
Publishing Company, 2nd ed., 1974). Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
coefficient (r) is a common measure of whether or not a correlation between two 
potentially related number sets exists, where an r value of -1.0 is a perfectly negative 
correlation, 1.0 is a perfectly positive correlation, and 0 is no correlation whatsoever. 
The coefficient is given by the formula  
r
239 Id. at 56-62. A simple one-tail t-test provides the sample distribution, the 
likelihood that a relationship is statistically significant, and not just the result of 
random error. The result is given by the formula 
240 Of course, correlation by itself does not necessarily imply causation. At the same 
time, given the extensive work linking wealth inequality to capital returns, see
PINKETTY, infra note 241, a causal relationship seems easy to imply from the strong 
correlation results.
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invariably exceeds the overall growth of the economy.241 Generating 
high returns on invested capital is essential to retaining and growing 
wealth.242 The fact that the U.S. securities laws provide a kingdom of 
exclusive investments to the highest echelons of the wealthy is only 
one among many reasons wealth inequality is on the rise. Yet this 
should not be the case. The public policy of our securities laws 
should be to promote market fairness and efficiency, not facilitate 
economic disparity. It is time to level the playing field and give the 
average investor the keys to the kingdom. 
V. GIVING THE AVERAGE INVESTOR THE KEYS TO THE 
KINGDOM
Most studies on wealth disparity have focused on income 
redistribution, not expanding investor opportunities, as the basis for 
solutions.243 If lack of investor opportunity contributes to wealth 
inequality, then addressing the source of the barrier—the federal 
securities laws—should be part of the solution. Presently, average 
investors seeking steady returns, or diversification options away 
from public equities susceptible to market risk, lack few options 
other than low-performing public debt and treasury securities.244 This
lack of options may contribute to the fact that savings rates among 
average Americans are in decline.245 Meanwhile, the significant 
advantages to issuers of raising capital through private offerings246
make new initial public offerings increasingly rare.247 The SEC itself 
conservatively estimates that at least half of the capital raised each 
year by businesses and investment funds comes from private 
                                                          
241 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Harvard University 
Press 2014).
242 See generally Sethi, supra note 5.
243 See, e.g., id. at 783-97.
244 See supra Part IV.B. This is not to say that treasury securities and bonds are 
useless investment instruments, rather, that by themselves they are insufficient 
diversification tools.
245 Lee, supra note 16, at 1008-11.
246 See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 32-34.
247 See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3407 (citing Douglas J. Leary, M&A 
Landscape in 2013: Whither the Bottom?, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS LAW 
2013: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 55 
(2013), available at 2013 WL 574804, at *4).
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placements.248 At the same time, less than ten percent of Americans 
can participate in such offerings.249
Disclosure is the foundation of the federal securities laws. 
As such, the SEC notes with particular dismay that, pursuant to their 
exemption from the Investment Company Act, investors have little to 
no information about private investment funds.250 Illiquidity, 
expensive management fees, and high levels of idiosyncratic risk 
contribute to the SEC’s concerns about private investments.251 These 
concerns are well founded. There is also no reason to dismantle the 
disclosure regime of the Securities Act entirely or to force all issuers 
to abide by the requirements of the Securities Act and the Investment 
Company Act. As Congress and the SEC both concede, private 
investment funds and private securities offerings provide numerous 
benefits to the financial markets.252 Continued rigid adherence to the 
Ralston Purina justifications253 for keeping private offerings 
exclusive to the very rich is, however, not only under-inclusive of 
who should be able to invest, 254 it is also grossly unfair to the middle 
class. 
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to revisit at least the 
accredited investor definition with respect to individuals.255 Rather 
than further restrict who qualifies as an accredited investor—as 
appears to be the Congressional intent behind this mandate256—the 
SEC should instead consider the numerous existing proposals for 
expanding investor opportunity. The SEC should likewise consider 
revising the qualified purchaser definition to expand access to private 
funds and their significant investment advantages. 
                                                          
248 Disqualification of Bad Actors, supra note 34, at 44754.
249 Id.
250 See, e.g., SEC Release 8766, supra note 10, at 8.
251 Id.
252 For instance, the SEC notes that hedge funds contribute to market efficiency, 
enhance overall liquidity in markets, distribute risk, absorb losses, and allow for 
portfolio diversification. SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 4-5. Congressional 
hearings on NSMIA reveal their belief that Section 3(c)(7) would encourage greater 
investment in emerging companies, promote the development of novel investment 
products, and reduce costs for institutional investors by relieving regulatory burdens. 
See NSMIA Hearings, supra note 71, at 4-5.
253 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
254 See, e.g., Finger, supra note 14, at 733.
255 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 413 (2010).  
256 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 16, at 990-91.
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Presently, both standards rely on net worth and gross income 
as proxies for the Ralston Purina objectives of investor 
sophistication, access to information, and ability to bear the loss.257
Some commonly proposed alternatives to this rigid standard include 
a financial literacy test administered by the SEC,258 establishing 
public mutual funds that would invest in private securities,259 and 
allowing for sophisticated investor self-certification similar to British 
law.260 In particular, private placement mutual funds offer interesting 
possibilities. First, because the fund managers would make the actual 
investment determinations for any money committed to the funds, 
this alleviates concerns about the purported inability of average 
investors to “fend for themselves.”261 Second, most average 
investors’ primary interaction with the capital markets is through 
their 401(k) plans (or similar tax-advantaged qualified retirement 
savings plans). As the tax treatment of 401(k) plans makes them 
inherently illiquid to begin with, the added illiquidity of including a 
private placement mutual fund in a 401(k) portfolio is 
inconsequential.262
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently 
performed its own review of the accredited investor standard and 
proposed that investors utilizing the services of registered investment 
advisers be able invest in private placements.263 Although this option 
avoids the rigidity of the current standards and promotes access to 
private offerings, only the relatively wealthy are likely able to afford 
registered investment advisers.264 In this respect, merely certifying 
those represented by registered investment advisers as accredited 
investors or qualified purchasers is an inadequate response to the 
inherent inequity of the present regime. 
                                                          
257 See supra Part II.A-B.
258 Oguss, supra note 14, at 310; Finger, supra note 14, at 763-66.
259 Rodrigues, supra note 15, at 3430-33.
260 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order, 2005, S.I. 
1529, art. 50A (U.K.).
261 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-26 (1953).
262 One of the most significant illiquidity concerns is the inability of investors to 
liquidate private securities to meet unexpected cash needs. See infra sources cited 
and text accompanying notes 100-06. This concern does not apply in the context of a 
401(k) plan because investors cannot withdraw from a 401(k) (except in extreme 
cases) no matter what the underlying investment strategy of the plan.
263 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-640, ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR 
QUALIFYING AS AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED (2013).
264 See, e.g., Finger, supra note 14, at 733.
43
Bender: Giving the Average Investor the Keys to the Kingdom: How the Fede
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
44 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 15 
The recent proposed regulations for the new Securities Act 
section 4(a)(6) exemption for crowdfunding may provide another
potential solution for private placements outside the crowdfunding 
context. Crowdfunding effectively allows average investors, 
informed by the “wisdom of the crowd,” to make a form of angel 
investment in a newly formed enterprise using a funding portal.265
Crowdfunding investments are potentially even riskier than other 
angel investments because many of the investment opportunities are 
likely to be extremely speculative, “idea only” 266 enterprises with 
limited business plans.267
To counter these risks while preserving the advantages of 
avoiding registration, the proposed crowdfunding regulations 
implement several safeguards. The “funding portal”—an 
intermediary between the investor and the issuer—is required to 
prepare and provide to each investor educational materials about the 
risks of investing.268 These educational materials must discuss the 
general risks of the investments, including illiquidity, dilution, and 
the possibility of losing most or all of an investment.269 The 
regulations further require intermediaries to prepare and present to 
all investors an acknowledgement of risk.270 This acknowledgement 
would ensure that the investor understands the risks of the 
investment, has reviewed the relevant educational materials, and is 
able to bear any potential losses.271 The proposed regulations also 
discuss using a questionnaire to assess investor understanding of the 
educational materials.272 Finally, the regulations impose an annual 
investment limit tied to annual income.273
Although the broader context of crowdfunding is extremely 
different from private investment funds, many of the safeguards 
proposed in the crowdfunding context may also be suitable in the 
private placement context. For instance, average investors could 
invest in private investment funds subject to a total annual 
                                                          
265 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 
315-21 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1); see also 
Crowdfunding, SEC Release No. 9470, 2013 WL 5770346 (Oct. 23, 2013) 
[hereinafter SEC Release 9470]. 
266 SEC Release 9470, supra note 265, at 26.
267 Id. at 15.
268 Id. at 68-69.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 76-78.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 9.
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investment limit tiered to their level of income or net worth. The
SEC could also prepare general educational materials about private 
investment funds and angel investments and provide them to 
investors. These materials could discuss, in plain English, the risks 
and benefits of private placements in general. So long as the SEC 
prepares the materials, and not broker-dealers or the funds 
themselves, issuers would face no additional costs or potential
liabilities (preserving a major advantage of private placements). The 
SEC could further require that investors sign a risk 
acknowledgement and complete a questionnaire prior to investing. 
Combining some or all of these proposals is one avenue by which the 
securities laws could provide middle class investors access to private 
placements without completely undermining the disclosure regime of 
the Securities Act. It also frees investors to determine for themselves 
what level of investment risk they are willing and able to bear. 
The SEC should also invest in investor education.274 Only a 
tiny fraction of Americans actually participate in the securities 
markets at all, much less private placements.275 Congress and the 
SEC need to ensure that all Americans understand the important role 
saving and investing play in generating wealth. Failure to do so will 
only exacerbate wealth disparity in America, regardless of whether 
average Americans can participate in private placements. 
VI. CONCLUSION
During hearings preceding the enactment of the Investment 
Company Act, the Chairman of the SEC noted: 
In general, everyone seems to be pretty much agreed 
that the functions of the investment trusts should be 
to afford the small investor an opportunity to spread 
his investment risks by a diversification of security 
holdings, to furnish competent and continuing 
investment supervision, and to assist in making 
capital available for industry. In a great many 
instances these objectives have not been realized.276
                                                          
274 It has largely done so already through initiatives like Investor.gov. 
INVESTOR.GOV, http://perma.cc/SYG4-YMMU (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
275 See Disqualification of Bad Actors, supra note 34, at 44758-59.
276 Inv. Trusts and Inv. Cos.: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 46 (1940) (statement of Judge Healy, Chairman 
of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n.). 46 (1940) (statement of Judge Healy, Chairman of 
the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n.).
45
Bender: Giving the Average Investor the Keys to the Kingdom: How the Fede
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
46 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 15 
Seventy-five years later, these principles remain a dream deferred; 
the securities laws continue to fail the small investor. Private 
placements permit the wealthiest Americans to preserve and 
accumulate wealth while the average middle class investor falls
behind. The accredited investor standard forecloses the advantages of 
direct investments in private companies to 90 percent of Americans. 
Meanwhile, the even more demanding qualified purchaser definition 
restricts investments in highly advantageous private investment 
funds—hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital 
funds—to only the wealthiest one percent. This legal regime has 
contributed over the past 35 years to the growing divide between the 
wealthiest Americans and everyone else. 
Most discussions about wealth inequality focus on income 
redistribution as the solution. In an age where earning higher 
investment returns leads to greater long-term wealth, a better 
solution is to expand investment opportunities. As the SEC 
reconsiders the accredited investor standard, it should strongly 
consider proposals—like sophisticated investor self-certification, 
mutual funds for private securities, annual investment limits, and 
educational materials combined with risk acknowledgements—that 
will open the kingdom of the private placement to the average 
investor. The middle class American investor has been left behind 
for far too long. The time has come to change his fate. Let’s give the 
average investor the keys to the kingdom. 
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APPENDIX B: 
REVERSE EXPECTATION HYPOTHESIS CALCULATION OF IMPLIED 
ANNUAL RETURNS ON PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
Annualized returns of private equity funds and venture 
capital funds are inherently difficult to estimate. Private funds derive
their returns from the acquisition and subsequent resale of private 
companies whose financial data are not public. Funds typically seek 
to exist their portfolio company investments on a horizon of seven to 
ten years. During the first years of the investment, the portfolio 
companies often decline in value as the fund management seeks to 
improve efficiencies and make capital investments that will generate 
long-term, rather than short-term, returns. Consequently, declining 
values in portfolio companies in early years of the investment cycle 
do not reflect the “true” economic performance of the fund. In 
addition, lifetime internal rates of return (“IRR”), a traditional 
measure of private equity performance, are often a poor measure of 
return on investment, at least from the standpoint of the investors.
IRRs measure the total return on the acquisition and divestment of 
the portfolio companies to the fund itself. IRRs, however, do not 
reflect real economic return to the fund investors because they do not 
exclude the management fees and carried interest that fund managers 
retain.
Data provided by Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven 
N. Kaplan, Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know? J. OF 
FIN. 33-34 (July 2013) (forthcoming) provides a partial solution. The 
authors use timed cash flows of approximately 1,400 funds to 
estimate both an IRR and a public market equivalent (“PME”) ratio.
The authors suggest that PME ratios serve as the best comparison to 
public market returns because they focus on capital returned to 
investors (net of fees and carried interest). The PME ratios 
approximate lifetime returns of private equity funds as a multiple of 
an equivalent investment on the S&P 500 (a PME of 1.09 is nine
percent greater than an equivalent investment on public markets). 
The problem with PME ratios is that they reflect lifetime excess
returns by vintage year (the year a fund is established) and not on a
year-by-year basis.
Some state treasuries and public pension funds release data 
on their private equity fund investments, and this data can help fill 
the gap. This analysis uses publicly available private fund 
performance from two sources: the California Public Employees 
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Retirement Service (“CalPERS”) Public Employees Retirement Fund 
(“PERF”), CALPERS, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
REPORTS (2001-2014), available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/forms-pubs/calpers-
reports/comprehensive-annual-financial.xml, and the Washington
State Investment Board (“WSIB”), WASHINGTON STATE 
INVESTMENT BOARD, PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW BY STRATEGY (2003-
2014), available at http://www.sib.wa.gov/financial/invrep_qr.asp. 
Given the volume of assets under management at CalPERS and 
WSIB (32.27 billion and 10.85 billion, respectively, as of 2013), 
their annual return data should provide a decent sample of overall 
private equity fund performance nationwide.
To imply the annual returns on private equity funds, this 
analysis undertakes six steps:
(1) Calculate a weighted average of the CalPERS and 
WSIB private fund returns based on assets under 
management.
(2) Assuming that the weighted CalPERS and WSIB 
average is representative of broader U.S. private 
equity performance, calculate the average fund life 
implied by the Harris, et. all, lifetime PME ratios. 
The calculation results in an average fund life of 
seven years. 
(3) For each PME vintage year (n), determine the 
corresponding S&P 500 return year (n + 7). For that 
year, calculate the compounded total return on a $1 
investment on the S&P 500 after seven years (the 
capital returned to investors at the end of seven
years).
(4) Multiply the resulting compounded return in year (n
+ 7) by the PME ratio (which describes the excess 
return on private equity over the S&P 500), to give 
the total seven year return on $1 invested in a private 
equity fund. 
(5) For years available, utilize the weighted average of 
the CalPERS and WSIB returns.
(6) For the years prior to the availability of the CalPERS 
and WSIB data, use a reverse expectation hypothesis 
to imply the missing years of annual returns using 
the PME ratio and the weighted CalPERS and WSIB 
returns as constants. 
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Assuming a seven-year fund life, the implied annual return 
(r) is given by:
=
The resulting r values for implied annual returns have a 











































































































2003 1.30 2.03 2.65 -
10.60

























2009 1.58 1.13 1.79 -
25.90













2012 0.99 1.32 1.31 1.00 34.18 5.65 10.38 2.08 2.08
200
7
2013 1.02 1.51 1.54 18.20 32.27 7.18 10.85 15.43 15.4
3
* Invested in year n and compounded using Appendix A data to 
reach year (n +7)
** S&P seven-year return x PME ratio
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*** For 2001-2013, r reflects the weighted CalPERS and WSIB 
return; for 1997-2000, r reflects the reverse expectation 
hypothesis formula to imply annual returns.
APPENDIX C: 
REVERSE EXPECTATION HYPOTHESIS CALCULATION OF IMPLIED 
ANNUAL RETURNS ON VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS 
Like private equity fund returns, returns on venture capital funds are 
difficult to estimate. This analysis uses a process similar to that for 
private equity funds (found in Appendix B) to imply the average 
annual returns on venture capital funds. There are two important 
differences between the process used for private equity funds and 
that used for venture capital funds:
(1) CalPERS returns are not available for venture capital 
funds as a distinct group from private equity. 
Therefore, the venture capital fund calculation uses 
only the WSIB returns and not a weighted average 
of both CalPERS and WSIB returns. 
(2) The average fund life for venture capital funds 
implied by the Harris, et. all, PME ratios is only six 
years as opposed to seven years for private equity 
funds. 
Assuming an average fund life of six years, the implied 
annual return (r) is given by
=
The resulting r values for implied annual returns have a 























1992 1997 1.34 2.68 3.60 74.82
1993 1998 2.74 3.20 8.78 91.62
1994 1999 2.86 3.52 10.07 23.02
1995 2000 2.09 3.16 6.61 -15.23
1996 2001 4.17 2.03 8.47 -15.32
1997 2002 2.65 1.29 3.42 15.72
1998 2003 1.48 1.25 1.84 -5.85
1999 2004 0.90 1.08 0.97 0.55
2000 2005 0.85 0.93 0.79 0.76
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2001 2006 0.84 1.19 1.00 6.47
2002 2007 0.88 1.42 1.25 6.16
2003 2008 0.99 1.15 1.14 -7.14
2004 2009 0.96 1.13 1.09 0.59
2005 2010 1.23 1.17 1.44 3.91
2006 2011 0.97 1.14 1.11 3.83
2007 2012 0.99 1.15 1.13 1.85
2008 2013 0.84 1.43 1.21 6.43
* Invested in year n and compounded using Appendix A data to reach year 
(n +6)
** S&P six-year return x PME ratio
*** For 2003-2013, r reflects the WSIB return; for 1997-2003, r reflects the 
reverse expectation hypothesis formula to impute annual returns.
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